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Every experience, those we are aware of and those we are not, is embedded in a
subjective timeline, is tinged with emotion, and inevitably evokes a certain sense of
self. Here, we present a phenomenological model for consciousness and selfhood which
relates time, awareness, and emotion within one framework. The consciousness state
space (CSS) model is a theoretical one. It relies on a broad range of literature, hence has
high explanatory and integrative strength, and helps in visualizing the relationship between
different aspects of experience. Briefly, it is suggested that all phenomenological states
fall into two categories of consciousness, core and extended (CC and EC, respectively).
CC supports minimal selfhood that is short of temporal extension, its scope being the here
and now. EC supports narrative selfhood, which involves personal identity and continuity
across time, as well as memory, imagination and conceptual thought. The CSS is a
phenomenological space, created by three dimensions: time, awareness and emotion.
Each of the three dimensions is shown to have a dual phenomenological composition,
falling within CC and EC. The neural spaces supporting each of these dimensions, as well
as CC and EC, are laid out based on the neuroscientific literature. The CSS dynamics
include two simultaneous trajectories, one in CC and one in EC, typically antagonistic in
normal experiences. However, this characteristic behavior is altered in states in which
a person experiences an altered sense of self. Two examples are laid out, flow and
meditation. The CSS model creates a broad theoretical framework with explanatory
and unificatory power. It constructs a detailed map of the consciousness and selfhood
phenomenology, which offers constraints for the science of consciousness. We conclude
by outlining several testable predictions raised by the CSS model.
Keywords: consciousness, time, awareness, emotion, self, default mode network, flow experience, meditation
INTRODUCTION
Every human experience, those we are aware of and those we
are not, is embedded in a subjective timeline, and is tinged with
emotion, be it the subtlest. At the same time, each experience
inevitably evokes a certain sense of self, either minimal (i.e., non-
conceptual first-person content, without personal identity) or
expanded and autobiographic (i.e., personal identity and con-
tinuity across time). Human experiences which are devoid of a
sense of time, phenomenal awareness, and emotional tone would
largely fall either into a category of neuropathology, or of an
altered state of consciousness. Certainly, time, awareness, and
emotion are all necessary ingredients of consciousness and self-
hood. But how are these all related to each other? Undoubtedly,
an endeavor relating these concepts within one framework, which
bridges phenomenology and neuroscience, is a presumptuous
attempt. However, this is what we will cautiously try to propose
here, a model named the consciousness state space (CSS), build-
ing on current formulations of consciousness and self, supported
by neuroscientific evidence.
The model is rooted in a view of the embodied mind, held
by both philosophers and cognitive neuroscientists (Varela et al.,
1991; Damasio, 1999; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Cosmelli and
Thompson, 2010), suggesting that consciousness behaves like
a complex non-linear dynamical system (Varela et al., 1991;
Thompson and Varela, 2001; Smith, 2005; Cosmelli et al., 2007)
created by a state-space (Fell, 2004; Werner, 2009). As CSS is
informed by both empirical evidence from cognitive neuroscience
and phenomenological accounts, it is essentially a neurophe-
nomenological model. Importantly, CSS is a theoretical model.
Yet, it relies on a broad range of literature, hence has high
explanatory and integrative strength, and helps in visualizing the
relationship between different aspects of experience. This is in
alignment with Revonsuo’s (2003) proposition: “The science of
consciousness should direct considerable resources to the system-
atic study of phenomenological issues, in order to first construct
a detailed map of the phenomenal level of description. . . . for
the features of the phenomenal level (how it is structured, how it
dynamically changes across time, and so on) offer top-down con-
straints for the science of consciousness in the search for potential
explanatory mechanisms in the brain” (p. 3).
Briefly, CSS suggests that three dimensions, time, awareness,
and emotion, create a state-space encompassing all possible total
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system behaviors, i.e., a repository of all potentially accessible
phenomenological states. These, in turn, fall into two large
categories of consciousness, each with its respective sense of self.
Section A Dual Organization of the CSS describes the dual orga-
nization of the CSS, as well as its neural space. Section The Three
Dimensions of the CSS describes the three dimensions of the
CSS. Section The Dynamics within the CSS describes the typical
antagonistic dynamic behavior of the system, as well as atypical
behavior of the CSS, when the typical antagonistic relationship
between the two categories is reduced, for example during the
experience of flow and in meditation. In section A Comparison to
OtherModels of Consciousness we compare CSS to other theories
of consciousness, to highlight its unique contribution. We con-
clude in section The Limitations, Predictions and Contribution
of the CSS Model by outlining the model’s limitations, as well as
its contribution by providing examples of testable predictions.
A DUAL ORGANIZATION OF THE CSS
A DUAL ORGANIZATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF, AND BRAIN
ACTIVITY
While avoiding philosophical definitions of consciousness (e.g.,
James, 1890/1950; Searle, 1994), which are beyond the scope of
this paper, the term consciousness here generally denotes, as in
previous neuroscientific approaches (Edelman, 2006; Boly et al.,
2009), an experienced property of mental states and processes,
which is lost during a dreamless deep sleep, deep anesthesia or
coma. Consciousness and self-consciousness are tightly related,
based on both philosophical accounts and cognitive theories
(e.g., Gennaro, 1996; Natsoulas, 1998; Kriegel, 2004; Morin, 2006;
Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008; Damasio, 2012). We are aware that
the concept of self has many definitions and that there is no con-
sensual framework for conceptualizing the various aspects of the
self. Yet, we adopt here an increasingly accepted framework for the
self, grounded in James’ (1890/1950) differentiation between the
self as “I,” the subjective knower, a momentary enduring presence,
and the self as “me,” the object that is known, the self-concept and
autobiographical identity. This framework distinguishes between
the “minimal self” (MS), a self that is short of temporal extension,
which is endowed with a sense of agency, ownership, and non-
conceptual first-person content, and the “narrative self” (NS),
which involves personal identity and continuity across time, as
well as conceptual thought (Gallagher, 2000). Consciousness can
also be divided into a simpler and a more complex form, each one
of them supporting one type of self-experience. The first is core-
consciousness (CC), which supports the MS, its scope being the
here and now. The second is extended-consciousness (EC), which
supports the NS, and involves memory of past, imagination of
future, and verbal thought (Damasio, 1999, 2012). Importantly,
while CC is independent of the EC, and relies only on its exchange
with the body (and environment), the EC is always dependent on
CC (Damasio, 1999). Hence, the NS is dependent on the MS, but
not vice versa.
In cognitive neuroscience the MS and NS have been attributed
to various different neural processes. Following, we will refer to
these neural spaces as Nms and Nns, respectively. While these
neural spaces cannot yet be fully identified, there is accumulated
knowledge suggesting main brain regions involved. NS has been
conceptualized as self-referential processing, such as assessing
one’s personality, appearance or feelings and recognizing one’s
own face or name. The neural regions supporting self-referential
processing are mainly the midline regions, including the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and
precuneus (Gusnard et al., 2001; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004;
Northoff et al., 2006), as well as the temporoparietal junction
(TPJ) and temporal pole (Christoff et al., 2011). The MS has
been attributed to self-specifying processing, experiencing one-
self as the agent of perception, action, cognition and emotion.
The cortical regions suggested to be involved include those related
to sensorimotor integration (such as motor and supplementary
motor area—SMA) and proprioception (the insula), as well as
higher-level regulatory regions, including dorsal anterior cingu-
late cortex (dACC) and dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) (Legrand,
2006; Legrand and Ruby, 2009; Christoff et al., 2011). Other
regions involved in the sense of agency include the TPJ and infe-
rior parietal lobule (IPL) (Chaminade and Decety, 2002; Blanke
and Metzinger, 2009).
Intriguingly, Nms and Nns can be related to a dual organiza-
tion of the cortex. Accumulating evidence supports this notion,
showing that thalamo-cortical networks can be divided into two,
often antagonistic, global systems (Fox et al., 2005; Golland et al.,
2007; Tian et al., 2007; Soddu et al., 2009): (i) a system of inward-
oriented networks (the “intrinsic” or default mode network -
DMN); and (ii) a system of externally-oriented, sensory-motor
networks (the “extrinsic” system). Resting-state activity involves
the DMN (Raichle et al., 2001; Greicius et al., 2003), a task-
inhibited network related to self-reference and mind-wandering.
The DMN includes a consistent set of five regions that comprise
the mPFC, PCC, IPL, medial temporal lobe (MTL) including
the hippocampus, and lateral temporal cortex (LTC) (Buckner
et al., 2008). Task-induced neural activity is related to the dorsal
attention network (DAN), which includes regions in the frontal
eye fields, ventral premotor cortex, the supplementary motor
area (SMA), superior parietal lobule, intraparietal sulcus, and
motion-sensitive middle temporal area (Corbetta et al., 2008).
Interposed between them is suggested to be the frontoparietal
network (FPN), which includes the anterior PFC, DLPFC, dorso-
medial superior frontal, ACC, anterior IPL, and anterior insular
cortex (Vincent et al., 2008). The FPN cooperates with either
one of these typically antagonistic systems, possibly integrating
information from, and adjudicating between, these two poten-
tially competing brain systems (Vincent et al., 2008; Spreng et al.,
2010; Smallwood et al., 2012). The FPN can be broken down
into two sub-networks (Seeley et al., 2007), the “executive control
network” (DLPFC and IPL) and the “salience system” (anterior
insula and ACC), with the latter also being specifically attributed
the role of switching between the intrinsic and extrinsic sys-
tems (Menon and Uddin, 2010). Following, we will refer to this
interposed network generally as Ni.
THE CSS CONTAINS TWO CONCENTRIC SPHERES
Based on the dual organization of consciousness, self, and
underlying neural activity, CSS is organized into two concentric
spheres around the body. The concentric organization depicts
the reliance of each sphere on the previous level: CC relies on
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science April 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 341 | 2
Berkovich-Ohana and Glicksohn The consciousness state space
the body, while EC relies on CC. The inner sphere of CC/MS
is phenomenologically related to the body, experiencing agency
and momentary sensory experiences. It is embodied. The inner
sphere is surrounded by the EC/NS sphere, which is phenomeno-
logically further away from the body, in the realm of conceptual
thought, language, memories and imagination, and relies more
onmental representation, rather than actual sensory experiencing
(Figure 1A).
We refer more generally to the neural space, mainly build-
ing on current neuroscientific knowledge. As to the neural space
of the CC/MS (Nms), this is the point where the physiological
condition of the body, which is in constant exchange with the
environment, becomes available to the brain. This mainly relies
on sensori-motor integration, i.e., convergence of action and per-
ception, allowing one to perceive the sensory consequences of
one’s action through action monitoring, and proprioception—
perceiving the body state. The proposed regions of the brain
involved in sensori-motor integration are SMA and pre SMA
(Legrand, 2006; Ferri et al., 2012), while proprioception involves
the somatosensory and insular cortex (Craig, 2002, 2009) as well
as a deep portion of the posterior cingulate (Parvizi et al., 2006;
Damasio and Meyer, 2009). The neural reference space of the
EC/NS (Nns) is largely suggested to involve the DMN. It should
be noted, however, that some posterior regions of the DMN,
including the IPL and precuneus, are argued to be involved in
both NS and MS due to their roles in agency (Chaminade and
Decety, 2002) and CC (Damasio and Meyer, 2009), respectively.
These regions can be viewed as a mutual reference space for both
spheres. Between the Nms and Nns there is the interposed Ni,
largely related to the control FPN system, which shifts between
collaboration with both (Figure 1B).
FIGURE 1 | (A) The concentric organization of the Consciousness State
Space (CSS). The central point denotes the body. Around it is the
core-consciousness (CC) and minimal-self (MS) sphere in white,
surrounded by the extended-consciousness (EC) and the narrative-self (NS)
sphere in gray. This circular organization depicts a shorter and longer
psychological distance from the body for the CC/MS and EC/NS,
respectively. (B) The suggested neural space, depicted as an oval. Within it
we identify three main networks, two of them supporting the MS and NS
(Nms and Nns, respectively), and the third interposed between them (Ni).
The body’s condition becomes available to the neural space through Nms.
Ni switches between synchronization (marked by circular arrows) with the
two other networks. Dashed lines denote alternation between the neuronal
states. The top state corresponds phenomenologically to CC/MS, and the
bottom to EC/NS. For the suggested brain regions for each neural space
see section A Dual Organization of Consciousness, Self, and Brain Activity.
Another important feature of the CSS is the existence of
two simultaneous trajectories of experience, each in one of
the spheres. This will be further developed in sections Second
Dimension of the CSS—Awareness and The Dynamics within
the CSS.
THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF THE CSS
A number of theories have described aspects of consciousness
within a state-space paradigm, choosing as dimensions different
parameters describing the system’s behavior. For example, Allan
Hobson and colleagues (Hobson et al., 2000) have introduced
a three-dimensional state-space model for the classification of
mental states during sleeping, dreaming and wakefulness. The
dimensions of this model are activation (the information pro-
cessing capacity of the system), information flow (the degree to
which the information processed comes from the outside world
and is or is not reflected in behavior), and mode of informa-
tion processing (the way in which the information in the system
is processed). This model shows how alertness, drowsiness and
sensory restriction are located within the state-space in rela-
tion to each other, and suggests the underlying brain structures
and chemistry. Another example was proposed by Wackermann
(1999) who developed a three-dimensional global approach to
representing the electrical activity of the brain. This model’s
dimensions are:  (a measure of global field strength, reflected
by the data cloud in the state space, in µV),  (a measure of
global frequency of field changes, reflected by the density of dis-
tribution of the momentary states along the trajectory speed of
field change, in Hz), and  (a measure of spatial complexity,
implying the simplicity/complexity of the data cloud, dimension-
less). Using this three-dimensional complexity description, the
electrical signature of a brain’s macro-state may be represented
by a trajectory in a three-dimensional space, which facilitates
electrophysiological data reduction. More closely related to the
current model, Fell (2004) suggested a three-dimensional state-
space that characterizes states of phenomenal awareness, with the
three state dimensions being the amount of synchronized electro-
physiological activity within different frequencies. In this model,
phenomenal awareness is related to decreased delta and alpha and
increased gamma activity.
We argue that a CSS is created by merely three phenomenolog-
ical dimensions: (i) subjective time—at one end past and at the
other future; (ii) awareness—at one end high and at the other low
phenomenal access; and (iii) emotion—at one end pleasant and
at the other unpleasant (Figure 2). Whereas the other state-space
models are quantifiable—that is, the dimensions are continuous
and lend themselves to quantification—the CSS model employs
dimensions, which refer to psychological distance from the body.
Further, the two concentric spheres of CC/EC and MS/NS, are
both structured by this same 3D coordinate system, as outlined in
length for each dimension separately. Pointing out these particu-
lar dimensions might raise the question as to whether, and how,
other important phenomena can be manifested in terms of these
three particular dimensions. We answer these questions by three
arguments.
Firstly, we argue that these three dimensions are phenomeno-
logically distinct. This is not to say that we think of these
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FIGURE 2 | The Consciousness State Space (CSS), depicting a
phenomenological space with three psychological dimensions.
dimensions as being self-sufficient for consciousness. We fully
acknowledge the crucial role of interconnectivity among these
phenomenological aspects to create the unity of conscious-
ness (Searle, 1994; Dainton, 2006). Furthermore, occasionally
these dimensions rely on similar, non-specialized, brain regions
(Pessoa, 2008). Yet, these dimensions can be characterized as
being phenomenologically distinct, while other phenomena could
be considered to result from the interplay among these three
dimensions. A major example is the general construct of cogni-
tion, which includes learning, memory, thinking and language
(Mayer et al., 1997), and which is also closely linked to emo-
tion (Pessoa, 2008), hence its different facets are spread over the
entire CSS.
Secondly, there are afferent and efferent functions, which are
tightly related to, but occur without, consciousness. This includes
action (motor output) and language, as speech (either mental
or executed), which can also be considered as an action (Jones
and Fernyhough, 2007). Since one becomes aware of one’s action
only after it has been initiated (Libet, 1985), and has sensory con-
sequences (Frith et al., 2000; Legrand, 2006; Carruthers, 2009),
these functions are excluded from CSS.
Thirdly, some key mental functions might “overlap” with, or
be closely related to, the dimensions presented here. For example,
attention is closely related to the awareness dimension, and is cap-
tured by it, as will be explained in the section devoted to aware-
ness. Another example is spatial cognition: while there is much
evidence which tightly links this to temporal cognition, both
phenomenologically and in the neural space (Barsalou, 1999;
Glicksohn, 2001; Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002; Walsh, 2003;
Glicksohn and Myslobodsky, 2006; Casasanto, 2008; Srinivasan
and Carey, 2010), there is also substantial research arguing that
spatial perception is actually the more fundamental dimension
(e.g., Srinivasan and Carey, 2010). However, CSS depicts human
experience, wherein subjective “time traveling” is far more fre-
quent compared to “space traveling.” Our life memories are
ordered along a time-line, and not a space-line (Wheeler et al.,
1997; Markowitsch, 2003). For that reason, CSS includes time as
one of its dimensions, and not space.
Next we describe the three dimensions of CSS in detail.
Importantly, each dimension behaves differently in the two
spheres, in both phenomenology and its neural space, as subse-
quently outlined.
FIRST DIMENSION OF THE CSS—TIME
Consciousness would be inconceivable without temporality, as
time is an omni-present structural feature of consciousness
(James, 1890/1950). As James wrote: “The knowledge of some
other part of the stream [of consciousness], past or future, near
or remote, is always mixed in with our knowledge of the present
thing. . . . These lingerings of old objects, these incomings of new,
are the germs of memory and expectation, the retrospective and
the prospective sense of time. They give that continuity to con-
sciousness” (p. 606–607). Past or future events can be activated
in experience voluntarily, and this constant mental time travel
aids one in understanding the meaning of present happenings:
“I don’t simply exist in the present and happen to have the capac-
ity to envisage the future and remember the past. Rather, human
reality is characterized by a kind of temporal stretch. The past
continually serves as the horizon and background of our present
experience, and when absorbed in action, our focus, the center of
our concern, is not on the present, but on the future goals that we
intend or project” (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008, p. 86).
We claim that this time dimension is sufficient, and can also
account for the spatial aspect of experience. First, at any time
point, one sees the world from only one spatial perspective
(Revonsuo, 2003). Second, each episodic memory has one (and
only one) spatiotemporal content (Russell and Davies, 2012).
Third, the phenomenal fields of different modalities are spatially
and temporally integrated, so that different features belonging
to the same object are realized in the same location and time
(Fingelkurts et al., 2010). Thus, spatial experience is fully inte-
grated with temporal experience in three important ways.
Several cognitive models have been proposed for
time-consciousness, most of them variants of a pacemaker–
accumulator clock, where experienced duration is represented
by a pacemaker which produces a series of pulses recorded
over a given time span (Zakay and Block, 1997; Glicksohn,
2001). Yet, competing cognitive models propose that memory
decay processes are involved in time perception (Wackermann
and Ehm, 2006). A contrasting view to the cognitive models
is Varela’s (1999) dynamic model of the experience of time,
according to which three different scales of duration contribute
to a cognitive act: the elementary (10–100ms), integration
(0.5–3 s) and narrative (>10 s) scales. Neurophysiologically,
the first two correspond to neuron-level electrophysiology and
synchronization. These further correspond to the experienced
present. Here, we adopt a dynamic view, akin to Varela’s view.
However, we differentiate between two time scales, combining
Varela’s elementary and integration scales into one: the immedi-
ate perception of the present moment (<3 s; see Pöppel, 1997),
contrasted with the longer time scale. The longer time scale
refers to the re-presentation of experience, while the second
refers to the immediate perception of the present moment
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(Figure 3A). By “re-presentation” we mean that experience, with
its full-blown, present-moment, multi-dimensional vividness,
is being “projected,” or re-presented (and not represented) into
another subjective time, either past or future. The fact that we
usually cannot both recall and be “here and now” simultaneously
is manifested by placing each of the two phenomenological
categories into the two different spheres of CSS. Following,
we describe in more detail these two categories along the time
continuum.
The first temporal category refers to the longer time scale,
and involves the re-presentation of experience in the past and
in the future. Unlike immediate perception, this is psychologi-
cally further away from the body: when one’s conscious aware-
ness re-lives the past or the future, one’s conscious awareness
is decoupled from the body (which experiences the now). It
encompasses mental re-presentations of other “nows,” relived or
imagined. The intriguing ability of the human mind to men-
tally travel through time, enabling one to relive past experiences
through memory, or project oneself into the future by gener-
ating a prediction based on memory, has been also referred
to as autonoetic (self-knowing) consciousness (Wheeler et al.,
1997; Stuss et al., 2001; Markowitsch, 2003). Hence, this expe-
rience pertains to the NS, and is within the EC/NS sphere.
At the past end, we find re-presentation of the far or near
past, by means of retrospective memory retrieval. This includes
either true or false memories, which are experienced as being
phenomenologically similar (Lampinen et al., 1997). Here, we
adopt Conway’s phenomenological description of autobiographic
memory (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2009), as
well as Tulving’s (1985) conceptualization of long-term memory.
Conway relates autobiographic memory with the NS (Conway,
2005). Autobiographic memory consists of recollected episodes
from one’s life, which are based on both episodic as well as seman-
tic memory (Tulving, 1985; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000;
Conway, 2005). Autobiographic knowledge comprises several lev-
els of categorization. First is event-specific knowledge, which is a
summary record of sensory-perceptual–conceptual-affective pro-
cessing derived from working memory, which is predominately
re-presented in the form of visual images (for example, a specific
restaurant). Event-specific knowledge, in turn, is contextualized
FIGURE 3 | A summary of the features of the three CSS dimensions: Time (A), Awareness (B) and Emotion (C).
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within a general event (e.g., during the vacation in Greece). The
general event, in turn, is associated with one or more lifetime
periods that locate the more specific knowledge within an indi-
vidual’s autobiographical memory as a whole (e.g., it was just
after our marriage) (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway,
2005). What is common to all these levels of autobiographic
memory is the phenomenal feeling of remembering: “the feeling
signals the state in an experiential way. Recollective experience,
the sense of the self in the past and the episodic imagery that
accompanies that sense, indicate to the rememberer that they
are in fact remembering and not daydreaming, fantasying, or in
some other non-memory state” (Conway, 2005, p. 614). At the
other end of the time continuum, the future, we find prospec-
tive memory, which is memory for future intentions (Glicksohn
and Myslobodsky, 2006), and refers to the functions that enables
a person to carry out an intended act after a delay (Burgess
et al., 2001). Another ubiquitous phenomenon is the genera-
tion of predictions and future simulations based on previous
autobiographic knowledge (Schacter and Addis, 2007; Schacter
et al., 2007), sometimes termed “proaction” (Bar, 2007, 2009).
Mental time-travelling to the future and the past can be actu-
ally “experienced” in the “here and now” (Gilbert and Wilson,
2007): if the mental simulation is strong enough, the imagined
or recollected images can evoke bodily reactions. At the same
time, actual sensory stimulation from the environment is blocked,
and one experiences sensory decoupling from the environment
(Smallwood et al., 2007).
We now turn to the second category, the immediate percep-
tion of the present moment (<3 s), which pertains to the CC/MS
sphere. Various models for the phenomenology of immediate
time perception have been proposed (Dainton, 2008). One major
category is retentional models: our experiencing of change occurs
within episodes of consciousness which themselves lack temporal
extension, but whose contents coordinate with past and future by
virtue of their place in the temporal structure (Dainton, 2008).
Specifically, we adopt the retentionalist model for conscious-
ness of time outlined by Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), which
assumes a Husserlian view: the immediate sensation, or the “pri-
mal impression” is combined with retention (being aware of
the “just-passed” slice of the experience) and protention (being
aware of the “just-about-to-be”). A perception cannot merely
be a perception of what is now, but must include a retention
of the just-passed and a protention of what is about to occur.
Importantly, retention and protention are not memory, or imag-
ination, which re-present the experience. Rather, they are actual
experience. Unlike long-term memory and expectation, they are
involuntary and automatic processes, and they could be argued
to be working memory (Vogeley and Kupke, 2007; Gallagher and
Zahavi, 2008). This experience is related in our model to the MS.
Turning to the neural space, the first category of autonoetic
consciousness, within the EC/NS sphere, should involve the Nns.
In contrast, CSS predicts that the immediate perception of the
present, within the CC/MS sphere, is related to the Nms and bod-
ily processing. As subsequently presented, these predictions are
confirmed by neuroscientific evidence.
The most important neural structure for memory is the hip-
pocampus, the locus of interaction between working memory
and long-term memory (Fell and Axmacher, 2011). It has been
proposed that memory initially depends on the hippocampus.
However, with increasing time, the hippocampus becomes less
important, and the involvement of multiple cortical regions
increases, including the medial frontal gyrus and precuneus
(Smith and Squire, 2009). Yet, new findings confirm the impor-
tant role of the hippocampus even in retrieval of long-term,
established memories, in collaboration with the ACC (Suzuki and
Naya, 2011). In a nutshell, the hippocampal complex is essen-
tial for encoding, retaining, and recovering experiences, enabling
the immediate subjective and vivid experience. Other regions,
mainly the prefrontal cortex, select, organize, help retrieve, mon-
itor, and verify the hippocampal recollection (Moscovitch, 2008).
Though both recent and remote memories are associated with
hippocampal activation, it was found that activations associated
with more recent memories cluster at the anterior hippocampus,
whereas those associated with more remote memories are dis-
tributed across its length (Gilboa et al., 2004). Not only memory,
but also planning involves the hippocampus, as well as frontal and
parietal structures. Strikingly, there is an overlap between mem-
ory systems and the network involved in foresight, and these two
overlapping regions also overlap with the DMN (key component
in Nns), including the hippocampus, mPFC, precuneus and lat-
eral parietal cortex (Bar, 2007, 2010; Schacter and Addis, 2007;
reviewed by Schacter et al., 2007). Another line of research, on
mental time traveling and “self-projection,” revealed the involve-
ment of the IPL (Nyberg et al., 2010), and the temporo-parietal
junction (Arzy et al., 2009), which are key regions for self-
referential processing and which are considered components of
the DMN.
Turning now to the cortical regions, which have been sug-
gested to be involved in the immediate perception of the present
moment, Rubia and Smith (2004) emphasize the DLPFC, ACC,
SMA, and IPL in their review of the literature. The IPL is also
strongly suggested by others who review the literature (Walsh,
2003; Oliveri et al., 2009). Another suggested region is the insula
(Craig, 2002, 2009; Wittmann, 2009), relating cognition of dura-
tion with proprioception. This proposition was supported by a
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, showing
a linear build-up of neuronal activation in the insula during
a time reproduction task (Wittmann et al., 2010) and by an
anatomical study (Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2011), showing that the
gray matter volume of the right sensory cortex is correlated
with the ability to discriminate time intervals. In addition to
the literature on time perception, we consider Baddeley’s (1992,
2003) influential model of working memory. Here, again, we
find that the DLPFC plays an important role, as an execu-
tive control system, assisted by two subsidiary storage systems:
the phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad (includ-
ing right and left IPL and premotor cortex, respectively), both
of which store perceptual information. Indeed, the DLPFC is
believed to provide a buffer to hold information in mind,
and to order it in space-time (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).
To conclude, as hypothesized, all the neural regions that are
related to momentary experience of time, as well as to working
memory, are within the FPN and DAN, considered as key ele-
ments in Nms and Ni, and in contrast, autonoetic consciousness
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and prospective memory involves the DMN, as a key element
in Nns.
SECOND DIMENSION OF THE CSS—AWARENESS
Awareness is a primary feature of consciousness, being the sub-
jective experience of internal phenomena, a perception of the
field of inner and outer events that encompasses one’s reality at
any given moment, the state of perceiving (Laureys, 2005; Cohen
and Dennett, 2011). Awareness can be largely categorized into
two types, following the influential conceptualization of Block
(1995, 2007), represented in CSS as the two sides of the aware-
ness dimension. The first is access awareness, which corresponds
to states that can be reported on, by virtue of high-level cognitive
functions such asmemory and decisionmaking, andwhich neces-
sitates attention. The second is phenomenal awareness, related
to private first-person experience, and occurs without—or with
very little—attention (Kouider et al., 2010). In contrast to this
division, awareness could also be conceived of as a graded phe-
nomenon (Kouider et al., 2010): at one end expanded awareness,
when all levels of relevant processing are accessible, and at the
other end complete non-awareness, when all levels of processing
are not accessible. Intermediately, there is partial awareness, com-
bining awareness at some level and unawareness at another level
of processing.
A possible solution to the current debate whether top-down
attention is necessary for consciousness (Cohen et al., 2012a,b)
or if these are two independent processes (Koch and Tsuchiya,
2007a,b; Tsuchiya et al., 2012) could be settled if we consider
that phenomenal awareness can emerge without top-down atten-
tion (Aru and Bachmann, 2013), in contrast to access awareness.
This would support the notion that attention allows information
to be more fully transmitted across cortical regions than unat-
tended information (Cohen et al., 2012b), hence is required for
access awareness. This argument supports our proposition that
the awareness dimension stands for attention as well.
In the following, we describe various phenomenal states
along the awareness continuum, moving from no phenomenal
access to high phenomenal access (Figure 3B). In doing so, we
largely rely on Gallagher and Zahavi’s (2008) account of pre-
reflective and reflective consciousness, as well as on Morin’s
(2006) social/personality model, describing degrees of conscious-
ness based on several theories (including Brown, 1977; Natsoulas,
1998; Schooler, 2002). Starting at no phenomenal access, we find
outside CSS states of consciousness in which there is no phe-
nomenal awareness to either external or internal input. These
include the dreamless portion of deep sleep, coma, anesthesia,
vegetative state, epileptic loss of consciousness, and somnam-
bulism. When one regains awareness, there is still no access or
memory as to external or internal happenings during that state.
Further along the continuum, there are preconscious states and
subliminal experiences. A division should be drawn between
inaccessible internal and external input. Processing of internal
input is conducted within the EC/NS sphere, and is referred to
here as “subliminal awareness.” This includes normal states of
day dreaming, as well as pathological states such as dissocia-
tion. Processing of external input is conducted within the CC/MS
sphere, and is referred to as “subliminal sensory awareness.” These
states include the natural decoupling of attention from sensory
processing (Smallwood et al., 2007), as can occur during driving.
All of these states are not accompanied by top-down attention.
Next, we describe the access states along the awareness
axis, which can be conceptual or non-conceptual (Kapitan,
2006), as subsequently detailed. First, within the CC/MS sphere,
there is first-order awareness, also called pre-reflective aware-
ness (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). This is an implicit and direct
awareness to experience, prior to any reflection on the experience.
In this state, according toMorin (2006), one will directly be atten-
tive and process external input from the environment, without
conceptual elaboration of the mental events that are taking place.
Hence, the organismwill be totally immersed in experience. These
states are accompanied by top-down attention to external input
(Chun et al., 2011). States along the access awareness within the
EC/NS sphere involve second-order awareness, also called reflec-
tive awareness (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). This is an explicit,
conceptual, and objectifying awareness, which is accompanied by
focal attention to internally generated input (Chun et al., 2011).
In this state, one attends directly to the cognitive experience itself.
It is described by Morin (2006) as the capacity to become the
object of one’s own attention, a process that occurs when an
organism focuses not on the external environment, but on the
internal milieu. In its extreme form, it becomes meta-awareness,
being aware that one is aware (Morin, 2006).
We rely on neuronal global workspace theory (Dehaene and
Naccache, 2001; Dehaene et al., 2006) to describe the correspond-
ing neural space, suggesting that conscious access is produced
through the interaction between specialized neural subsystems
and amultimodal limited capacity global workspace (Baars, 2002,
2005), the FPN (the key component of Ni). During states of
phenomenal awareness, including subliminal and preconscious
states, activation due to internal or external input does not
involve the FPN. In contrast, during states of access awareness,
synchronized activity increases in the FPN, which becomes capa-
ble of guiding intentional actions including the production of
verbal reports. The transition between phenomenal and access
awareness is sharp, as expected in non-linear dynamic systems
(Dehaene et al., 2006). Furthermore, CSS posits two simultane-
ous trajectories, one in the EC and the other in the CC. As these
two trajectories are usually antagonistic, habitually one has access
awareness only to the phenomenology related with one of the
trajectories, while the phenomenology related with the second
trajectory continues its activity at a sub-threshold level, within the
phenomenal awareness continuum (Figure 4). Hence, the brain
alternates dynamically, shifting awareness from internal to exter-
nal processing. The actual phenomenal experience is constantly
dictated by the neural space that is more active at the moment,
and which is synchronized with the Ni. When one is immersed in
“intrinsic” (i.e., Nns) activity, one is “decoupled” from extrinsic
processing (i.e., Nms), which nevertheless continues (Smallwood
et al., 2007; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011). And vice versa, while
externally engaged, the intrinsic system is continuously activated
in a “sub-threshold for awareness” manner. Indeed this is what
Singer has been proposing from the early 60s, in his exposition
of daydreaming (Singer, 1966). As he has more recently suggested
(Singer, 2009, p. 196), “Many years ago I proposed that what we
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FIGURE 4 | (A) The two trajectories in the CSS are shown (red denotes the
CC/MS trajectory, and orange the EC/NS trajectory), with their dynamic
behavior. A full line denotes access awareness, while a dashed line denotes
phenomenal awareness. The figure shows a quarter of the CSS, depicting
the future/unpleasant space. Gray denotes the CC/Ms 3D space. The three
time points demonstrate the typical antagonistic behavior of the two
trajectories. At t0, the CC/MS trajectory is under the threshold for access
awareness; hence one has access awareness to the EC/NS trajectory. For
example, one is driving, decoupled from sensory awareness (present
moment and relatively neutral emotionally) while mind wandering,
imagining a future unpleasant experience. At t1 there is a threat on the
road, resulting in a phase transition: the CC/MS trajectory arrives at the
threshold for access awareness, and at the same time, the EC/NS
trajectory shifts under the threshold for access awareness. At t2, the
CC/MS trajectory expresses negative arousal due to the danger, while the
EC/NS trajectory becomes even more unpleasant due to self-criticism for
lack of awareness to the driving, continuing at a subliminal level of
awareness; (B) a schematic diagram of the neural space behavior over the
same specific three time points. N1 corresponds to the neural space of the
CC/MS sphere, and N2 to the neural space of the EC/NS sphere. At t0, FPN
is collaborating with N2 (one phenomenally experiences thoughts). At the
short transition at t1, all networks are at threshold level for access
awareness (one phenomenally experiences “no thoughts”), and at t2 the
FPN collaborates with N1 (one phenomenally experiences high
concentration while driving).
now call the brain’s default network may be almost continuously
active at a subthreshold level.” The FPN alternates between coop-
eration with the intrinsic or the extrinsic systems. This notion is
supported by the findings that a systematic impairment of FPN
was found in altered states of consciousness, such as sleep, anes-
thesia, coma, vegetative state, epileptic loss of consciousness, and
somnambulism (summarized by Boly et al., 2009), all of these
being states which are considered outside the model’s aware-
ness dimension. This suggests that an intact FPN, enabling access
awareness, is a prerequisite for a normally functioning CSS.
In relation to this neural space, both second-order aware-
ness (within the EC/NS sphere, upper side of continuum) and
mind wandering, i.e., subliminal awareness (within the EC/NS
sphere, lower side of continuum) have been related to DMN activ-
ity (Nns). However, what differentiates between states has been
shown to be DLPFC activation, which characterizes thoughts
that occur with access awareness (Smith et al., 2006; Christoff
et al., 2009). The suggested role of FPN as switching collaboration
between the two neural spaces which support the two phe-
nomenological spheres along the access awareness is illustrated by
the following studies. In relation to the inner sphere of CC/MS,
an fMRI study (Ferri et al., 2012) showed that the “bodily-self”
(self rooted in bodily motor experience) recruits pre SMA, SMA
and insular regions, belonging both to the FPN and DAN sys-
tems (Ni and Nms, respectively). In relation to the outer sphere of
EC/NS, an fMRI study emphasized the importance of the DLPFC
(Ni), as participants learned to regulate its activation by turning
their attention toward and away from the contents of their own
thoughts, or their DMN-intrinsic (Nns) system (McCaig et al.,
2011).
THIRD DIMENSION OF THE CSS—EMOTION
Emotion and consciousness are considered by many to be insep-
arable (e.g., Damasio, 1999; Lambie and Marcel, 2002; Panksepp,
2005; Barrett et al., 2007; Tsuchiya and Adolphs, 2007), as each
conscious state is endowed with some form of emotion, to the
point that even the perceptual representation of everyday objects
carries subtle affective tone (Lebrecht et al., 2012). Put in the
words of Searle (1994, p. 7), “part of every normal conscious expe-
rience is the mood that pervades the experience. It need not be a
mood that has a particular name to it, like depression or elation;
but there is always what one might call a flavor or tone to any
normal set of conscious states.”
Emotion states are generally agreed to bear two important
phenomenal features, the one is mental and the other bodily,
grossly speaking. Hedonicity is both intrinsic to bodily states,
and depends on the interpretation placed on them. A similar
differentiation has been done with many, albeit calling it by var-
ious names. Schachter and Singer (1962) described emotional
experience as a combination of general arousal, and the cogni-
tive attribution of the cause of this arousal. Similarly, Mandler
(1984) distinguished between non-specific arousal, awareness
of which provides the intensity of the emotional experience,
and the evaluative structure (cognitive interpretation of the sit-
uation), which provides the particular content and quality of
emotional experience. Damasio (1999) views emotional experi-
ence as consisting of sensory changes that occur in the viscera
and internal milieu (which he calls emotions) and the men-
tal image of these sensory patterns (which he calls feelings).
According to Lambie and Marcel (2002), any emotional state
is defined by a combination of two things: the bodily action
readiness (and its representation) and the evaluative descrip-
tion (a mental representation). The first includes certain bodily
and brain systems which are activated in response to stimuli
(chiefly the limbic, autonomic, hormonal and aspects of the skele-
tal nervous system). The second, the evaluative description, is an
appraisal leaving a record, a description of how one’s concerns
or one’s self have been affected by the event. This is a men-
tal representation. Barrett’s (Barrett, 2006; Barrett et al., 2007)
view of emotion involves two operations. The first is called “core-
affect,” which includes bodily fluctuations that are represented
in the brain. The second is “conceptualization,” a process by
which stored representations of prior experiences (i.e., memo-
ries, knowledge) are used to make meaning out of sensations
in the moment. To summarize, there is general agreement that
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emotional states bear two important phenomenal features, one
mental and the other bodily. Following, we will refer to these
two components of emotion as valence (a subjective feeling of
pleasantness or unpleasantness) and arousal (extent of bodily
excitation), respectively.
We suggest that the manifestation in CSS of these two phe-
nomenological qualities of the emotional experience, namely
arousal and valence, is within the CC/MS and EC/NS spheres,
respectively (Figure 3C). Within the CC sphere, arousal increases
in two directions stemming from a minimal degree of arousal
at the center of the emotion continuum. Valence, manifested
within the EC sphere, increases toward the pleasant and unpleas-
ant ends of the continuum. Each emotional experience has an
arousal component, namely a bodily and sensory element, and
valence, or a mental representation, in line with the above for-
mulations of the phenomenology of emotions, and with the two
CSS trajectories. The relationship between valence and arousal
has been subject to a long debate, and various models have been
proposed. A classical description is Russell’s (1980) circumplex,
suggesting an orthogonal relationship. In another framework,
Lewis et al. (2007) suggest that aspects of valence generate a
U-shaped curve with arousal. According to such a framework,
strong positive valence is accompanied by strong positive arousal,
and similarly for the negative aspects. Yet, others suggest that
the dissociation between valence and arousal might be an issue
of measurement more than reflecting distinct qualia underly-
ing emotional experience (Larsen et al., 2003; Kron et al., 2013).
For example, Russell (1989) has explicitly opposed the idea that
arousal is only a physiological concept, writing (p. 106), “. . . there
is no more reason to speak of arousal as strictly physiological and
pleasure-displeasure as strictly mental then there is to express it
the other way around.” In comparison to the ongoing debate, the
CSS model accounts for both valence and arousal, and allows for
an orthogonal relationship between them. This means that each
point on the arousal continuum could be in principle accompa-
nied by any simultaneous point on the valence continuum, as it
depends on the interpretation placed on it, which might be mul-
tiple for any given bodily state (as accounted by Schachter and
Singer, 1962). As for the Lewis et al. U-shaped proposed rela-
tionship, we propose this should be rejected because negative
arousal can sometimes be accompanied by positive mental eval-
uation, as in Schachter and Singer (1962), or as in the example
of watching safely a horror movie. Further, the interplay between
the emotion and awareness dimensions within CSS predicts a
novel relationship between arousal and valence, namely antago-
nism: emotional states involve both evaluation and the products
of arousal, but both of these need not be simultaneously present
in experience or awareness, and certainly are not always experi-
enced as such. This means that one can have access awareness
to either the arousal or valence aspect at each specific moment
and state, and that access awareness alternates between them. As
a trait, one can be more prone to emphasize either the arousal or
the valence, as shown by Barrett (1998). In addition, the inter-
play between the emotion and awareness dimensions creates a
wide spectrum wherein emotional experience can be classified
in terms of accessibility, as suggested by Lambie and Marcel
(2002), Damasio (1999) and Frijda (2009), from non-conscious
emotions, through phenomenal emotions (1st-order emotional
experience), to awareness of emotional experience (2nd-order,
emotional experience).
CSS predicts that the neural space for the arousal compo-
nent of emotion should be related to the Ni and Nms (their
key components being DAN and FPN, respectively), while the
valence component should be related to the Nns (i.e., DMN).
The evidence for that is based on a meta-analysis conducted
by Barrett and colleagues (Barrett et al., 2007; Kober et al.,
2008; Lindquist et al., 2012), stemming from a construction-
ist approach to emotion, where the assumption is that emo-
tional mental states result from an interplay of more basic
psychological processes that may not, themselves, be specific
to emotion (Barrett et al., 2007; Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist
et al., 2012). According to this meta-analysis, the distributed
network involved in realizing core-affect includes several sub-
cortical, as well as cortical regions: the amygdala, which sig-
nals whether exteroceptive sensory information is motivationally
salient; the anterior insula, which plays a key role in represent-
ing core affective feelings in awareness based on its role in the
awareness of bodily sensations and affective feelings; portions
of the orbitofrontal cortex, as a site that integrates exterocep-
tive and interoceptive sensory information to guide behavior;
ACC, and more specifically subgenual ACC, regulating somato-
visceral states, pregenual ACC, as a visceromotor (i.e., autonomic)
control area involved in resolving which sensory input influ-
ences the body when there are multiple sources of sensory input,
and anterior midcingulate cortex (a part of the FPN), delivering
sources of exteroceptive and interoceptive sensory information
to direct attention and motor response. The regions suggested
by this constructionist approach fall largely within the intero-
ceptive/exteroceptive processing network, as well as the FPN, as
suggested by CSS.
In Barrett’s (Barrett et al., 2007; Lindquist et al., 2012) view,
the mental representation (valence) is specifically related to the
DMN: “In our model, categorization in the form of situated
conceptualization is realized in a set of brain regions that recon-
stitutes prior experiences for use in the present. This set of
brain regions has also been called the ‘episodic memory net-
work’ or the ‘default network’. . . this psychological operation
makes a prediction about what caused core affective changes
within one’s own body or what caused the affective cues (e.g.,
facial actions, body postures, or vocal acoustics) in another
person, and this prediction occurs in a context-sensitive way
(with the result that core affect in context is categorized as an
instance of anger, disgust, or fear” (Lindquist et al., 2012, p.
129). Another important network for categorization and emo-
tional perception includes the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) and
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC). Further, the DLPFC is
postulated as being involved in mental states of attending to
emotional feelings or perceptions, and holding affective informa-
tion in mind in order to categorize it (Lindquist et al., 2012).
Hence, the constructionist approach to emotion provides sup-
port for CSS, both regarding the categorization of emotions
as being coupled with the DMN, as well as attributing to the
FPN the role of mediating the activity within the two CSS
spheres.
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THE DYNAMICS WITHIN THE CSS
TYPICAL CSS DYNAMICS
The CSS model is a dynamic system, with rich self-organizing
properties. One novel aspect of CSS is the suggestion that each
sphere functions as a separate dynamic system, with its own
trajectory over time (Figure 4A). The two trajectories are simul-
taneously present, one within the inner sphere of CC/MS, and
the other in the surrounding sphere of the EC/NS. These trajecto-
ries are usually antagonistic, and phenomenal awareness switches
between them, as elaborated in section Second Dimension of the
CSS—Awareness. In the neural space, this is manifested by the
collaboration, through synchronization, of the Ni with either Nms
or Nns (Figure 4B). This antagonistic behavior, however, should
not be seen in early childhood.
While the detailed ontogenetic development of CSS is
presently beyond the scope of this paper, we nevertheless out-
line in short its development, based on Heinz Werner’s (1978, p.
108–109) orthogenetic principle of development, that “wherever
development occurs it proceeds from a state of relative globality
and lack of differentiation to a state of increasing differentia-
tion, articulation, and hierarchic integration.” This orthogenetic
principle has been shown to be consistent with the genetic orga-
nization of the cortex (Chen et al., 2012). Akin toWerner’s (1978)
notion of increasing differentiation and hierarchic integration,
CSS is proposed to manifest with development as a successively
more complex structure. In support, Anokhin et al. (2000) report
that EEG dimensional complexity increases with age between 7
and 17. Moreover, the two trajectories in the CSS should, early
on in development, be indistinguishable (Werner’s “relative glob-
ality”), and the corresponding CSS space should comprise one
global sphere (and not two). Support for this proposition was
given by a recent fMRI study showing that it is only from around 2
years that the antagonistic behavior between the cortical networks
is first observed (Gao et al., 2013).
There could also be states where both trajectories are under
the threshold for access awareness, for example dreaming, and
states where both trajectories enable access awareness, where
one attends to the activity of the intrinsic system, without
being immersed in it, as an observer such as in meditation.
Neuroscientific studies of the neural space support this intuition:
during dreaming, most of the DMN deactivates, as well as the
extrinsic system (Nir and Tononi, 2010). Similarly, activity in the
intrinsic system may persist in parallel to extrinsic stimulation if
external stimulation is not sufficiently challenging (Greicius and
Menon, 2004; Wilson et al., 2008), or when one attends to the
activity of the intrinsic system (Christoff et al., 2009), as is the case
during meditation (Travis and Shear, 2010). Next, we describe
cases of alteration in typical CSS dynamics. All these states, we
suggest, involve an alteration in the regular sense of NS, as is the
case in early childhood (Oatley, 2007).
ALTERATIONS IN TYPICAL CSS DYNAMICS
We suggest that alterations in typical CSS dynamics occur when
the regular sense of NS is modified. While the typically antagonis-
tic behavior of the trajectories essentially indicates differentiation,
here we discuss those conditions wherein hierarchic integration
is achieved (in Werner’s terms). These states have been termed
“no-self,” “transpersonal,” or “transcendent” states, and they can
occur in a spontaneous or training-induced manner (Alexander
and Langer, 1990; Pascual-Leone, 2000; Hartman and Zimberoff,
2008). Such states have been related to enhanced performance
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1990; Leary et al., 2006) and heightened
happiness (Dambrun and Ricard, 2011). We predict that these sit-
uations can be seen phenomenologically (first two predictions) as
well as being translated into neural space (last two predictions),
resulting in:
(1) A transition toward the CC/MS trajectory being more avail-
able to access awareness;
(2) An “integration” of the CC/MS and EC/NS trajectories,
phenomenologically;
(3) Higher activity in the neural space related to the CC/MS and
lower activity in the neural space related to the EC/NS;
(4) Increased synchronization between the typically antagonistic
networks.
To support these propositions, we bring evidence from two dis-
tinct states, both described as involving alterations in the sense
of self: optimal experience, also called flow (Csikszentmihalyi,
1988, 1990), and meditation (Hölzel et al., 2011; Fell, 2012;
Vago and Silbersweig, 2012). These two states have been some-
times considered to be largely similar (e.g., Kristeller and Rikhye,
2008; Bermant et al., 2011). However, others consider flow
and meditation to diverge in their phenomenology and ulti-
mate aim, as flow fosters development through higher challenges
and skill refinement while meditation mainly points toward
self-transcendence (Delle Fave et al., 2011). Moreover, flow is
largely spontaneous and transitory, whereas themeditative state is
training-induced and can become an enduring condition. While
we do not expect isomorphism between flow and meditation
in the phenomenological and neural spaces, we bring both as
examples of an alteration in the sense of self and increased hier-
archic integration, demonstrating how we can put the CSS to
work.
The state of flow
Flow is a state in which a person performing an activity is fully
immersed in a feeling of energized focus, full involvement, and
enjoyment in the process of the activity. In essence, flow is charac-
terized by complete absorption in what one does. Conceptualized
by Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 1990), flow is an optimal experi-
ence of maximum enjoyment, and a good balance between the
perceived challenges of the task and one’s own perceived skills.
Importantly, it is a state characterized by an altered sense of
self. In fact, Csikszentmihalyi (1990, p. 85) describes “excessive
self-consciousness” as being the major internal obstacle to experi-
encing flow, as it “lacks the attentional fluidity needed to relate to
activities for their own sake; too much psychic energy is wrapped
up in the self, and free attention is rigidly guided by its needs.”
According to Csikszentmihalyi (1988), flow is defined by eight
characteristics:
(1) Flow occurs when we confront challenges where we have a
chance of achievement;
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(2) The challenges have clear goals and provide immediate
feedback;
(3) There is a merging of action and awareness;
(4) There is intense concentration and absorption in the present
moment with no intruding thoughts;
(5) There is a distortion of temporal experience, one’s subjective
experience of time is altered, and time usually seems to pass
faster;
(6) The experience of the activity as autotelic—containing its
own meaning and purpose, not motivated by anything
beyond itself, thematically self-contained;
(7) There is a loss of reflective self-consciousness;
(8) There is a sense of personal control or agency over the
situation or activity.
Now, we consider the arguments that support a transition toward
the CC/MS trajectory being more available to access awareness
(prediction 1). First, at the center of the awareness continuum,
at the sharp switch from non-awareness to awareness, a per-
son is fully immersed, concentrated and completely absorbed in
an activity. This resembles the third and fourth dimensions of
flow. Moreover, flow is considered to occur at a subliminal level
of awareness, making the experience difficult to distinguish by
recollection (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1990). Similarly, Dietrich
(2004) positioned flow in between maximal implicit process-
ing and minimal explicit processing. Dietrich (2003, 2004) also
related the flow experience to low DLPFC activity, calling it a state
of “hypofrontality.” This is in accord with our suggestion of low
Ni activity from the center toward the lower end of the awareness
dimension.
Second, at the center of the time continuum one experiences
fully the present moment. This resembles characteristics four and
five, describing flow as being totally in the present moment, to the
point that one experiences a distortion of time.
Third, at the center of the emotion continuum we expect to
find emotional tranquility, due to a balance between negative
and positive valence. This resembles characteristic number six,
describing flow as being meaningful, and the general equation
between flow and enjoyment. This might be a little counter-
intuitive at first, as flow could be supposed to be pleasurable,
hence might be placed toward the pleasant side of the emo-
tional continuum. However, there is a distinction between plea-
sure and enjoyment, as emphasized by Csikszentmihalyi: “any
piece of work well done is enjoyable. None of these experi-
ences may be particularly pleasurable at the time they are taking
place. Experiences that give pleasure can also give enjoyment, but
the two sensations are quite different” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990,
p. 46). A recent fMRI study (Ulrich et al., 2013) investigated
the neural correlates of “flow” (challenging task difficulty was
dynamically adjusted to participants’ individual level of skill).
Comparing “flow” to “boredom” and “overload” conditions (very
low and very high task demands, respectively), decreased activ-
ity was reported for the amygdala during the flow condition.
Furthermore, amygdala activity was negatively correlated with
subjective rating of flow. This was interpreted as indicating
reduced negative arousal during the flow state, which is in accord
with the CSS prediction.
Fourth, being at the center of CSS means experiencing the
agentic MS, and being further away from the self-conscious
NS. This is in agreement with the last two dimensions of flow,
and is supported by the study of Ulrich et al. (2013), showing
significantly lower mPFC activity during the flow state.
Fifth, being at the center of CSS predicts a highly embod-
ied state. Indeed, Csikszentmihalyi (1990) describes flow states as
being intimately related to the body: “It is through the body that
we are related to one another and to the rest of the world. While
this connection itself might be quite obvious, what we tend to for-
get is how enjoyable it can be. Our physical apparatus has evolved
so that whenever we use its sensing devices they produce a posi-
tive sensation, and the whole organism resonates in harmony” (p.
115–116).
Up until now, we have provided evidence that the state of
flow, as an example of an altered experience of the self, supports
proposition 1, namely a transition toward the CC/MS trajec-
tory being more available to the access awareness. The third
characteristic of flow—“There is a merging of action and aware-
ness,” in itself supports proposition 2 of an “integration” of the
CC/MS and EC/NS trajectories, phenomenologically. As to neural
space, the neuroscientific research of flow is scarce. However, the
fourth proposition—namely less antagonism between the intrin-
sic and extrinsic networks—is given initial support by Ulrich et al.
(2013), who reported three DMN regions (angular gyrus, supra-
marginal gyrus, and parahippocampus) to show U-shaped neural
activity with increasing task difficulty, indicating lowest DMN
activity during the “flow” condition, as opposed to “boredom”
and “overload” conditions. Intriguingly, and counter-intuitively
to the common “push-pull” antagonism notion, DMN activity
is not minimal with “overload.” Taken together, the state of flow
supports three of the four proposed changes in CSS and its neural
space.
Meditation—state and trait
The word “meditation” is used to describe self-regulating prac-
tices that focus on training attention (Cahn and Polich, 2006).
Meditation is expected to alter self-referential processing, as the
major aim of practice is the realization, by direct experience, of
the lack of any essential “self” (Dreyfus and Thompson, 2007).
This has been supported by ample phenomenological studies
(Austin, 2000; Leary et al., 2006; Dambrun and Ricard, 2011).
Findings from meditation studies indicate training-induced neu-
roplasticity, both in function and in structure, (Cahn and Polich,
2006; Ivanovski andMalhi, 2007; Davidson and Lutz, 2008; Rubia,
2009).
One form of meditation that has been extensively studied
is mindfulness meditation (MM), stemming from the Buddhist
Theravada tradition, defined in a Western context as “the aware-
ness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the
present moment, and non-judgmentally to the unfolding of
experience moment by moment” (Kabat-Zinn, 2003, p. 145).
Looking closely at this definition, we see that it embeds train-
ing for all three CSS dimensions: awareness (awareness that
emerges through paying attention on purpose), time (experience
moment by moment) and emotion (non-judgmentally). We sub-
sequently show that MM training induces a transition toward
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the CC/MS trajectory being more available to access awareness
(prediction 1).
First, in relation to the time dimension, it was previously sug-
gested that meditation induces a change in subjective temporal
experience toward emphasizing the “now,” or being less aware of
the passage of time (Brown et al., 1984). Being at the center of
the time continuum in an absorbed manner can be measured as
longer and longer time production (indicative of a slower rate of
functioning of the internal timer, demonstrating that time seems
to be moving slower; Glicksohn, 2001). In agreement with that,
longer time production was shown in MM practitioners com-
pared to control participants (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2011), and
a slower internal timer was indicated in another study (Kramer
et al., 2013). Second, subjective reports on the effects of med-
itation have included heightened perceptual awareness (Brown,
1977; Baruss, 2003; Carter et al., 2005). This is supported by
physiological studies showing MM practice to increase bodily
awareness (Farb et al., 2007; Kerr et al., 2013). Third, vari-
ous meditative practices were shown to lower the intensity of
emotional arousal (Aftanas and Golosheykin, 2005; Nielsen and
Kaszniak, 2006), to result in trait reduction in anxiety and neg-
ative affect, and an increase in positive affect (Davidson et al.,
2003), and to entail lower amygdala reactivity during focused
attention meditation (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007). MM was
also shown to increase tolerance of negative affect (Chambers
et al., 2009; Farb et al., 2010), possibly by restoring balance
between affective and sensory neural networks—supporting con-
ceptual and embodied representations of emotion (Farb et al.,
2012). Together, these data support prediction 1 of a transition
toward the CC/MS.
In addition, accumulating evidence supports prediction 3,
namely higher Nms activity and lower Nns. For example, evidence
shows that MM practice lowers the DMN (key network in Nns)
activity (Farb et al., 2007; Pagnoni et al., 2008; Brewer et al., 2011;
Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2012, 2013; Dor-Ziderman et al., 2013;
summarized by Fell, 2012; Jerath et al., 2012). More specifically,
variousmeditative techniques showed decreased activation in sev-
eral areas of the DMN during practice, including the precuneus
(Tang et al., 2009; Ives-Deliperi et al., 2011), mPFC (Farb et al.,
2007; Brewer et al., 2011; Ives-Deliperi et al., 2011), PCC (Pagnoni
et al., 2008; Tang et al., 2009; Brewer et al., 2011), ACC (Pagnoni
et al., 2008; Ives-Deliperi et al., 2011;) and LTC (Pagnoni et al.,
2008). A similar result was shown using EEG, where lower frontal-
midline gamma power (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2012), or lower
gamma functional connectivity (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2013)
were indicative of lower trait DMN activity.
Finally, several recent fMRI studies support prediction 4,
namely increased synchronization between the typically antag-
onistic networks. An fMRI study showed a stronger coupling
between the intrinsic and extrinsic systems during non-dual med-
itation (Josipovic et al., 2011). Brewer et al. (2011) reported
that the correlation between areas involved in cognitive control
(dACC, DLPFC), which are part of Ni, and the PCC area in the
Nns were higher for experienced meditators than controls, both
at rest and during meditation. Additionally, it was shown that
during MM practice, as compared to rest, functional connectivity
is strengthened between the DAN (comprising Nms) and DMN
(Nns) (Froeliger et al., 2012). To summarize this section, we have
provided support from meditation research for three predictions.
A COMPARISON TO OTHER MODELS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
This section posits CSS in the wider context of different
approaches to consciousness. Obviously, other theories are men-
tioned here briefly, as their elaboration is beyond the scope of this
paper. CSS provides a phenomenological map which includes all
possible consciousness states. It suggests that all possible states of
consciousness are a combination of three dimensions, and that
each consciousness state involves a specific sense of selfhood.
It also describes the system’s dynamic behavior. Furthermore, it
provides a tentative neural space. Such a description is totally
missing in the literature. However, it builds on previous theories
of consciousness, which describe some of these dimensions at a
time, as outlined below.
Various theories of consciousness suggesting functional
descriptions have emerged in the last decade (reviewed by Lau
and Rosenthal, 2011; and by Seth et al., 2008). These include
neurodynamical approaches to consciousness (Varela et al., 1991,
2001; Tononi and Edelman, 1998; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Dehaene and Changeux, 2005; Tononi, 2008). Despite their differ-
ences, these variousmodels agree that the constitution of dynamic
spatiotemporal patterns of neural activity, namely neuronal syn-
chrony, plays a central role in the emergence of consciousness
(reviewed by Cosmelli et al., 2007). Specifically, these theories
explain what differentiates conscious experience from subliminal
or un-conscious experience (Dehaene et al., 2006), why thala-
mocortical anatomy suits conscious experience as opposed to
different neural architectures such as seen in the cerebellum, or
afferent and efferent pathways (Tononi, 2008), and how the pro-
posed gap between qualia and brain activity (Chalmers, 1995) can
be reduced. CSS builds on Tononi’s (2008) integrated informa-
tion theory, accepting that the neural space is mainly attributed to
thalamocortical loops, that consciousness arises from integrated
informational relationships generated by a complex of elements
in the neural space (Tononi’s “main complex”), and that the
larger the complex, the greater the information the system can
generate. CSS sees consciousness as essentially embodied, as pre-
viously emphasized by others (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson and
Varela, 2001; Cosmelli and Thompson, 2010). CSS also incorpo-
rates workspace theory (Dehaene et al., 2006), as elaborated in the
section on awareness. However, the CSSmodel departs from these
theories, by proposing to explain phenomenologically all possi-
ble states of consciousness, as well as suggesting a possible neural
space.
Other phenomenological accounts describe states of con-
sciousness along a continuum of experience of the self. Some
theories emphasize the awareness dimension, including those pre-
sented by Schooler (2002), Brown (1976), and Natsoulas (1998),
which are then integrated into a unifying social/personality model
describing degrees of consciousness and selfhood (Morin, 2006).
Other theories emphasized the importance of time (includ-
ing Neisser, 1988; Stuss et al., 2001; Newen and Vogeley,
2003; Zelazo, 2004) or emotions (including Lambie and Marcel,
2002; Panksepp, 2005; Barrett et al., 2007; Tsuchiya and
Adolphs, 2007) in relation to selfhood. In relation to these
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models, CSS extends the experience of selfhood to encom-
pass both the time and emotion dimensions in one coherent
framework.
Importantly, Damasio (1999, 2012) provides a neuroscientific
account for consciousness and self, which has inspired our model,
although we departed from it substantially, as subsequently elab-
orated. Damasio outlines and combines two theories (Dolan,
1999); the first concerns the propagation of consciousness and self
from body along a continuum: from (1) an unconscious bodily
self (proto-self), which deals with the state of the internal milieu
and creates a first-order representation of current body states
in the brain, to (2) the core-self (CS), which gives rise to core-
consciousness (CC). CC is a complex of second-order mental
maps based in the feeling state, which arises when the proto-self
interacts with the first-order sensory maps that represent objects;
and finally, (3) Extended consciousness (EC), which depends on
CC, deals with holding inmind, over time, amultiplicity of neural
patterns that describe the autobiographical-self (AS). AS is heavily
dependent on the formation of enduring experiential memories,
attention and language, and its inevitable concomitant is personal
identity. Damasio’s second theory concerns affect, and has been
referred to briefly before (section Third Dimension of the CSS—
Emotion). To enable a careful comparison of CSS with Damasio’s
view, we refer the reader to Table 1.
Damasio’s view is largely adopted in CSS concerning the CC
and EC, and their respective type of selfhood. A major difference
is positioning both types of consciousness and self on an aware-
ness continuum, where both can be either conscious or non-
conscious, as opposed to the gradual propagation of conscious
experience described byDamasio. A secondmajor departure from
Damasio’s view concerns emotions, his three levels of emotion
being replaced by the two dimensions of valence and arousal. As
a result of these differences, when the linear view of Damasio
is replaced by the 3D view of the CSS, more flexibility is avail-
able to the system, and explanatory power increases. For example,
Damasio’s view could not explain unaware emotional mental
evaluation (Winkielman and Berridge, 2004; Sato and Aoki,
2006), unaware mental representation of numbers (Greenwald
et al., 2003; Ric and Muller, 2012) or unaware semantic priming
(Dehaene et al., 1998; Naccache and Dehaene, 2001).
To conclude this section, the relationship of CSS to other
models of consciousness has been elaborated, especially with
regard to Damasio’s view. This comparison was intended to high-
light the integrative, unifying and explanatory power of the CSS
model.
THE LIMITATIONS, PREDICTIONS AND CONTRIBUTION OF
THE CSS MODEL
The CSS model has several limitations, which warrant delin-
eation. First, CSS describes a phenomenological space, and also
attempts to suggest its neural space. The neural space described
here should be regarded as a coarse attempt based on current
understanding. Second, the resolution between states in phenom-
enal space is much higher than current resolution in neural space
(as already discussed by Fell, 2004), rendering a full translation
from the phenomenological to the neural space impossible at
the moment. Third, the important issue of how core cognitive
functions, such as emotion regulation and reward, are created by
the interplay between the three dimensions was left out. Finally,
the presentation of the CSS model in this article leaves some
important issues untouched, including: (1) Individual differences
in the size and shape of CSS; (2) Pathologies of consciousness
and selfhood; (3) Elaboration on the neural reference space to
include electrophysiological activity; and (4) The location of
altered states of consciousness within the CSS, an issue strongly
related to the “breakdown” of the time dimension. These issues
would hopefully be the topic of further developments of the
model.
We conclude by providing examples of several predictions
of the model which relate to current debates in the literature,
and which are scientifically testable. First, given that an expe-
rience can fall into any coordinate in CSS, the model predicts
some experiences which are still being debated. For example,
albeit the controversy about the very existence of unconscious
emotions (e.g., Clore, 1994; Winkielman and Berridge, 2004),
the model predicts that full-blown emotions (including hedonic
Table 1 | A comparison between Damasio’s (1999) theory of consciousness and the CSS model, describing points of departure.
Dimension Damasio’s view CSS model—points of departure
CC Stable across the lifetime of the organism; it is not exclusively
human; and it is not dependent on conventional memory,
working memory, reasoning, or language
Phenomenological space can increase with mental training,
dependent on working memory and when involves
awareness, dependent on attention
3 types of self Proto, unconscious Body, unconscious
Core, involves CC, conscious Minimal, can be either aware or unaware
Autobiographic, involves EC, conscious Narrative, can be either aware or unaware
Types of affect Emotions—bodily, public, primary or secondary emotions, can
be non-conscious, involves CS
Arousal—involves core affect, can be either aware or unaware
Feeling—private, mental experiences of an emotion, can be
non-conscious, on the boundary between CS and AS
Valence—involves conceptualization, can be either aware or
unaware
Feeling of feeling—involves AS and conscious experience
CC, core consciousness; EC, extended consciousness; CS, core self; AS, autobiographic self.
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feeling and appraisal) could be experienced without access aware-
ness. Second, based on the dual phenomenological composition
of each of the three dimensions, CSS predicts that their inter-
action in experience (access awareness) takes place only in the
same sphere. For example, during emotion evaluation (outer
sphere), one cannot simultaneously process external output
(inner sphere). Or if one experiences core emotions/arousal
(inner sphere), one cannot experience simultaneously mental
time traveling (outer sphere). Obviously, this bears consequences
for the neural spaces’ interaction, requiring antagonism between
the corresponding structures (as described in this paper), which
could be readily addressed empirically by blood oxygenated level
dependent (BOLD) fMRI studies. Third, CSS predicts that any
well-reasoned condition in which one would expect hierarchic
integration and alteration in the regular sense of NS, such as flow
and meditation, will exhibit the four predictions laid out in sec-
tion Typical CSS Dynamics, including that the two neural spaces
should be positively correlated. Fourth, a prediction concern-
ing complexity can be derived from CSS development (section
The Dynamics within the CSS). As CSS manifests with develop-
ment as a successively more complex structure, it predicts not
only increasing complexity with age, but decreasing complexity
in conditions of hierarchic integration, such as flow and medita-
tion (for a similar view, see Sharp, 2011). For example, children
should have a CSS which is more “global” in a Wernerian sense
(hence, less complex), and meditators should have a CSS which is
more hierarchically integrated (hence, also less complex). Partial
support for this prediction was given by a finding of lower dimen-
sional complexity during meditation, compared to rest (Aftanas
and Golocheikine, 2002).
The model presented here creates a broad theoretical frame-
work with explanatory and unificatory power, that attempts to
make sense of a wide range of otherwise unrelated phenomeno-
logical and neuroscientific observations. Importantly, the model
provides a new framework for understanding the relationship
between core aspects of consciousness, hence lays a theoretical
basis for the study of consciousness. We hope this model will
inform future studies, and raise further testable predictions.
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